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Bulletin of the Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies (BRIIFS)

Peter Madros deceased in 2019, before the publication of this article.

This contribution will explore the extent to which Abrahamic dialogue is dependent upon unity rather than diversity and will make reference to scriptural readings as well as interpretations about Moses. The setting of our conference is appropriate as it takes place near Mount Nebo, from where Moses is said to have seen the Promised Land and to have died nearby. Jews, Christians and Muslims share some of the same Scriptures and/or stories but read them in different ways. The Church Fathers, for example, were astonished at what they considered to be Jewish ‘blindness’: their failure to comprehend the truth proclaimed in their own sacred texts. This developed into what became known as the Adversus Iudeaoes literature. Likewise, Jewish writers were perturbed by Christian interpretations not rooted in the original Hebrew or that completely abandoned the simple meaning of the words in favour of other – especially messianic – significance. Muslims for their part would see their Scriptures, the Qur’an, as perfecting and fulfilling the other two. The main argument of my essay is that apologetics and polemic may be features of scriptural hermeneutics, there is however a more positive story to tell. It is a combination of the search for common scriptural ground (‘unity’) as well as the need to take difference seriously, including polemic (‘diversity’) that provides a sound basis for interfaith dialogue today.

“In the Hebrew Bible and in its ancient Greek and Aramaic versions, the figure of Moses is presented in a multitude of perspectives. Our focus is on the supernatural visions that, according to biblical texts, he experienced. In the Book of Exodus a series of extraordinary visions is granted by God to Moses (Ex 3:1-6; 19:16-25; 24:9-11; 24:15-17; 33:9-11; 33:17-23; 34: 27-33). These visionary experiences have the function of consecrating him as the guide of the people, as the liberator from Egyptian slavery, and as the mediator / transmitter of the law established by God. In Judaism of Roman-Hellenistic period, inside and outside the Land of Israel, different Jewish groups give various representations of the figure of Moses oriented to express different cultural functions of him and also various ways of relation between the Jews and the surrounding peoples. As an example of a transformation of the image of Moses through times we take into account the episode of the “transfiguration” narrated in the Gospels of Mark, Luke and Matthew (Mk 9:2-9; Lk 90:28-36; Matt 17:1- 9) and also reported in other texts of Jesus’ followers of the first two centuries.1 In this episode, the figure of Moses plays a prominent role and his visionary experiences take on particular meanings.”

The figure of Moses is very complex in the Islamic tradition, both in terms of the interpretation of the Qur’anic passages concerning him, as well as what is mentioned in the Qiṣaṣ al-Anbiyāʾ (Tales of the Prophets), that is the vast literature which deals with the stories of the prophets prior to Muhammad.1 The present contribution offers a study of the figure of Moses on the basis of a structural analysis of the sacred text of Islam. It is based on two assumptions: that Moses is, without fear of contradiction, the most cited prophetic figure in the Qur’an; the fact that the Qur’an is increasingly shown to be, under the lens of linguistic and historical exegesis, to be a text that is anything but disorderly and chaotic (as it was judged by Francesco Gabrieli among the many, calling it an “unbearable jag”), but rather a wisely composed and ordered text.

In his SOUVENIRS PERSONNELS, published posthumously in 1967,1 Marie-Joseph Lagrange (1855-1938), founder of the École Biblique et Archéologique Française in Jerusalem, comments the publication in 1906 of the answers given by the Pontifical Biblical Commission to four doubts about the Mosaic authenticity of the Pentateuch: “On June 27, the Holy Father gave approval to the decision of the Commission on Pentateuch, by which it considered that it was opening the door a certain distance to literary criticism, either on the theory of Moses’ secretaries, as they have been called, or by the admission of additions, notes and explanation. In order to appreciate the full significance of these concessions, we must remember that scholarly champions of the authenticity of the Pentateuch had been accustomed up to then to base their arguments on the antiquity of its linguistic forms.”2 A vision too optimistic, which immediately highlights the emptiness of the linguistic “proof.” As we shall see, the archaism of language had a precise apologetic purpose: to minimize the scope of certain embarrassing texts, assuming a “primitive” meaning for certain terms. But the French scholar insinuated another principle for the hermeneutics of the Vatican text: the silence on some matters. In addition to the timid opening of some doors, the document omitted to mention the “dangers” to which Catholic theology would have been exposed if it had relativized the whole belonging of the first five books of the Bible to the work of Moses. But Lagrange’s contemporaries knew well that any openings in this sense would gravely affect an apologetics based on the role of an eyewitness recognized to the ancient legislator.

Mose – מֹשֶׁה (Mosheh), Μωυσῆς or Μωσῆς (Mōysēs or Mōsēs), موسى (Mūsā) – belongs without doubt to those figures of religious history, who have experienced an incomparably broad reception far beyond the original religious-historical and traditional context and who have remained in historically effective memory to this day. From the very beginning, however, he has been portrayed as a shimmering figure. Therefore, years ago already, Robert Martin-Achard rightly called the Moses of the Hebrew Bible a figure polysémique, as can be learned from the numerous attributes and honorary titles bestowed upon him.

A Lecture at the Royal Geographic Society, London, 12th January 2016

[First §] In 1999, the sociologist Peter Berger noted that: “the world is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so than ever.” He called the process ‘desecularization. In the same year, The Economist published its millennium issue and included an article entitled ‘God: After a lengthy career, the Almighty recently passed into history. Or did he?’ The reader was informed that the “test will come on Judgment Day, when man, we are told, will meet his maker. Or will it be God meeting his?”

A disagreement between two philosophers, William Alston and J.L. Schellenberg, on the matter of religious commitment serves to exemplify an important difference between religious believers and religious sceptics. The disagreement occurs in the context of a discussion over the plausibility of Alston’s doxastic practice approach as applied to religious belief. I argue that a close reading of Alston and Schellenberg shows that they do not, despite what they may think, differ greatly from each other. I conclude by drawing some lessons for interreligious dialogue, particularly that the focus of engagement should not necessarily be to convince but rather to uncover differences in attitude.

[First §] Iqbal states that the essence of “Tauhid” ‒ meaning the “oneness of God” ‒ is human unity, human equality and human freedom. Therefore, practically speaking, the spirit of Islamic culture liberates man rather than enslaving him. However, an objection is raised that while the emphasis on human “unity” and “equality” might be understandable, can “freedom” be associated with “Tauhid”? Is not “freedom” a product of contemporary Western thought? Does not every Muslim “bear witness” by offering prayers that the Holy Prophet is “Abdohu,” i.e., the “slave” of Allah. Consequently, are not all Muslims are expected to be the slaves of God?