In A SPEECH DELIVERED IN February 2003, British Prime Minister Tony Blair declared: “The destruction of the environment and global warming are as great a threat to world peace as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction” (Brown 2003). This statement highlights two dimensions of risk in the contemporary world: first, the question of human sustainability in ‘world risk society’ and, second, the limits to global governance and political security. These are, as Jim Whitman outlines below in his paper, “Global Governance and the Mitigation of Complex Risk,” different approaches to the general question of risk, uncertainty and insecurity that have not yet been brought together. On the one hand, there is sociological literature on ‘risk society’ and risk’s intractability and pervasiveness in late modernity and, on the other, literature on ‘global governance’ and the challenge of regulating global issues and political movements. The former sees risk as a systemic and structural condition of the technological and organizational complexity of modernity; the latter makes us wonder whether we have the organizational and regulatory mechanisms to manage the complexity of ‘world risk society.’ This collection of papers about risk and human sustainability comes out of a conference on “Risk, Complex Crises and Social Futures” held in Amman in October 2003. They address three key questions. First, how aware are we of the risks that we face? Second, does risk engender a way of thinking? And, third, how is risk managed or used by governments?

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How aware are we of the risks that we face?

For some time, sociologists have argued that increased risk is a structural condition of modernity-of the organizational and technological complexity of the industrialized world. The very success of industrial society and modernization has had the unintended consequence of making the world seem more dangerous, rather than more secure. It has become what Ulrich Beck describes as “reflexive,” gradually eroding the system from within to increase risks, instead of reducing them. The use of science to manage nature has led to greater hazards in areas such as

nuclear power (toxic waste and accidents) and fossil fuel use (rising levels of CFCs, carbon dioxide and greenhouse gases), human medicine (thalidomide) and intensive agriculture (mad cow/foot and mouth disease). The limits of technological solutions to emergent risks are Starkly revealed in the growing number of uninsurable risks. Previously there were few areas where risk could not be reduced to a cost–that is, an insurance premium. Today, private insurance does not cover nuclear disasters, the impact of climate change, the breakdown of national economies, or genetically modified organisms, to give only a few examples. Since 11 Šeptember, even the aviation industry is having difficulties with insurance. But if the insurance industry provides an indicator of known risks, it cannot identify risks that are as yet unrecognized. Risk, by definition, is recognized by its visibility, not invisibility. As Beck, the best-known sociologist writing on risk observes, the more globally interdependent the world becomes, the larger the risks become as well. ‘World risk society’ is not something that can be politically chosen or rejected. As Whitman notes, these larger risks are emerging out of the complex interaction of human and natural systems whose global dynamics “fall outside of the calculation of risk and, indeed, sometimes outside of timely human comprehension.” Moreover, Niklas Luhmann points out that the growth in risk is not necessarily amenable to the solutions of modernity: in fact, “the more rationally we calculate, and the more complex the calculations become, the more aspects come into view involving uncertainty about the future and thus risk” (Luhmann 1993, 28). Paradoxically, as risk increasingly becomes the dominant organizing principle, governments are less able to control the impact of global complexity. Instead of seeking to analyze complex crises, they respond by simplifying the issues and reducing them to matters of law and order or security, areas in which they can be publicly seen to be acting. Intensive media coverage of violence, accidents and disasters only brings the concept of risk to the foreground by making the invisibility of risk visible through its focus upon victims and safety, and offering individuals security maps of dos and don’ts–what to eat, where to live, what cars to drive, where to holiday and so on in safety. In Whitman’s view, ‘risk society’ literature becomes quite paralyzing

in its response to the future and the “daunting structural outcomes” of modernity seem to overwhelm us, rather than presenting us with a challenge to explore how we might live. Another problem with the risk society perspective is the extent to which it universalizes the predicament generated by the affluent and technologically advanced world. In fact, the consequences of the risk engendered by modernity is unequally distributed across societies which have different capacities to respond: for example, the fate of the Maldives may already have been sealed by global warming. In other words, there are enormous variations in the ability of states to manage risk.

The other literature on risk, without actually using that term, is the work done on global governance. This literature, according to Whitman, addresses the impact of globalization on states-in particular, the diffusion of state power to non-state actors. Its focus is upon the “proliferating” sources of governances on the one hand and the capacity of global forms of regulation to accommodate them on the other. His criticism of this literature is that it is still reactive, rather than providing an imaginative response to the possible construction of new social futures.

Globalization is also seen to amplify risk by engendering individual alienation. There is an widening gap between the globalizing system

and individual experience of it with a resulting increase in personal anxiety and uncertainty. For Zygmunt Bauman (1998, 59), “the deepest meaning conveyed by the idea of globalisation is that of the indeterminate, unruly and self-propelled character of world affairs; the absence of a centre, of a controlling desk, of a board of directors, of a managerial office.”

The challenge produced by ‘world risk society’ is described by Whitman as ‘complex risk,’ namely, “hazards, susceptibilities and uncertainties that are sometimes acknowledged and managed, sometimes unwilled and unanticipated, variously calculable or incalculable, and within, between, or altogether outside of existing modes of regulation and control.” For Whitman, this complexity arises from the interaction of human and natural systems.

While risk society refers to actual changes in our environment, it can also refer to the growth of our risk-averse culture. The extent to which we face increased risk is, in part, a matter of perception. Hence, while the ‘realists’ argue that we now face risks which are new/different and qualitatively greater, the ‘social constructivists’ argue that it is our perception of risk that has changed. Every paper in this collection engages this distinction between new risks and their perception.

Does risk engender a way of thinking? If risk is as much a matter of perception as the product of real structural change, then it is not a universal construction, but a cultural one which produces very different interpretations and responses in different places. For example, the heightened perception of the threat from terrorism in the West post-11 September is very relative and recent when seen from the perspective of societies in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and Asia, which have recent histories of violence and internal warfare. The increased sense of risk in the West is highly secular, individually-centred and oriented toward safety and the reduction of loss or harm. Sociologists refer to this Western outlook as the product of a risk aversion culture.’ Frank Furedi (2002b) describes it as an “epidemic of fear” in which perceptions of risk and safety have less to do with empirical evidence than with “cultural assumptions about vulnerability:” Far from facing an actual increase in life-threatening dangers, the Western societies increasingly concerned about risk are currently more secure than ever. Individual life expectancy and health levels are much higher in the West than they are elsewhere, despite the emergence of new risks from war, terrorism, drugs, motor accidents and environmental pollu-

tion.

What ‘risk aversion culture’ means is that Western societies have a “low threshold towards losses” (Furedi 2002a, 17). This is a consequence of a shift in focus from wealth to security (Beck 1999). The banning of genetically modified organisms in the European Union is an example of culturally-specific risk aversion that is currently at the centre of EU politics (Borrás forthcoming). The EU population is not merely concerned about the production of economic wealth, but also about such values as “safety, security and protection.” As Susan Borrás argues, “Risk is what a human collectivity decides is unsafe, and develops low tolerance to the uncertainties that this object/situation/technique generates” (Ibid.).

Risk aversion is only exaggerated by the fact that many risks are invisible and their consequences not apparent for a long while. For instance, the potential ill effects of mobile phones upon health is a constant theme in the press- _which is ironic because a strong selling point in marketing mobiles has been increased safety through immediate communication.

The latest alarm warns that men who carry mobile phones in their pockets might negatively affect their sperm counts (Boseley 2004).

Furedi (2002a) sums up our ‘risk aversion culture’ as follows: “Safety has become one of Western society’s fundamental values, and people find it difficult to accept that some injuries cannot be prevented. An injury caused by an accident is an affront to a culture that believes safety is its own reward.”

More than just different perceptions of risk are involved here. ‘Risk thinking is itself the product of a very West-centric view of the world. It refers to the idea that we have to defend ourselves against an unpredictable future in which the past has lost its power to determine the meaning of the present. The idea of risk, of what the future holds for us, has become the organizing principle of a globalizing world. It is focused, in particular, upon the individual and is often reduced to feelings/perceptions related to personal security. Safety is pursued through greater vigilance and improved technologies of law enforcement and surveillance, rather than through strengthening community and shared values.

The cultural relativity of risk and the basis for imagining culturally-different social futures are explored in this issue in papers by William O. Beeman (“The Concept: ‘Risk,’ East and West”) and Nathan J. Brown (“Imagining and Building Syncretic Futures”). William Beeman looks at the different cultural perspectives on risk by comparing world-views from modern Western societies as opposed to more traditional societies in Asia and the Middle East, where individuals remain more socially embedded in familial and community relationships to a greater degree. He observes that a sense of control over personal destiny generates a paradoxical relationship between risk-seeking behaviour and the fear of danger from risk. Drawing upon the work of Mary Douglas, he notes that the feeling of danger arises from a sense of disorder in the world. Cultural perspectives, however, shape readiness to take risks. Thus, American citizens are more prepared to take risks in proportion to the danger that they perceive. By contrast, risk from an

Islamic perspective refers to how individuals chose to live their lives. Beeman concludes that, in Islamic culture, “risk is really ‘no risk.”” Far from being pressured or intimidated by future threats, Muslims see these questions as religious and moral in nature. From a Hindu/Buddhist perspective, because all action/risk furthers the progress of the universe and life cycles, then “through risk, one creates no risk.” This broad comparison of world-views and attitudes toward risk is quite revealing of the culturally-specific orientation of ‘risk society.’ In a culturally-focused case-study on imagining social futures, Nathan Brown explores peace-making, constitutionalism and nation-building in Palestine. The risk here, although not explicitly stated, lies in deciding upon a basis for securing Palestine’s future as an autonomous nation with-

out undue reliance on external institutional borrowing to develop a modern constitution and educational system. What Brown offers is both a critique of constitutional models as necessarily Western and a discussion of syncretic possibilities for an Islamic constitutionalism and the development of educational curricula reforms. He argues that, in the tension between individual and collectivity, there is clear evidence of syncretic attempts to create individuality that is shaped by tradition. Here, the future is not being imagined simply in response to an individualized sense

of risk, but by binding the individual to community values and traditions.

How is risk managed by governments?

The majority of the papers in this collection deal with the politics of moving between actual risk and perceptions of risk in the context of very different issues–water, terrorism, peacemaking,_ illegal trade and HIV/AIDS. Of course, if we accept the proposition that risk is a cultural construction, then the distinction between actual and perceived risks is quite problematic. Nevertheless, the very idea that the politics of risk is about visibility and perception emphasizes the fact that risk can be foregrounded or backgrounded.

In his paper, “Foregrounding and Backgrounding Risk: Consequences for Water Policy-Making in the MENA Region,” Tony Allan explores risk perception in relation to water policy. He argues that risk in water politics centres upon the choice between the “certainties” of the “hydraulic mission” of modernity and the “uncertainties” and risks that accompany environmentalism, economic efficiency and participative water resource policy-making. His paper describes how competing interest groups have different risk perceptions and use different science to advance their cases. Government, the private sector and social movements all have distinct perspectives which correspond closely with Mary Douglas’ model of ways of life, which proposes that there are four distinct perspectives on getting things done: fatalism, hierarchy, ethics and entrepreneurship. In water politics, government, the private sector and civil movements respectively manage risk, take risk, or avoid risk altogether. The point here is that different groups emphasize the risks that they are aware of while, at the same time, neglecting or ignoring others which can be measured. Allan’s paper goes on to reveal the limited thinking behind water policy. Water, he points out, is not just about local watersheds, but is also

about a political economy of water that encompasses ·the globe. The easiest way to reduce risk with regard to water resources is to import grain because it contains ‘virtual water’ or the water required to grow it. Moreover, given that agriculture uses between 70 to 90% of water resources in water-poor countries, any Strategy that creates jobs outside of the agricultural sector alleviates water risk. The benefits of such political economy may or may not be advertised by politicians in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Allan also points out that, because risk is socially constructed, the risk perceptions and policy choices of the North do not necessarily coincide with those of the South, where the idea of putting water back into the environment is not on the agenda. Susan Kippax’s paper, “Risk and Responsibility: Interventions in HIV. Prevention,” also highlights the different perceptions of risk that have shaped government policies, this time in the field of public health. Public health strategies reflect the ways in which governments construct the social distribution of risk from disease and illness and blame. Kippax points out that state perspectives on risk and disease have changed from traditional public health concerns with the underlying causes of health and disease to a ‘modern’ public health focused upon

an individualist epidemiology. In medical terminology, a ‘risk group’ is not social in nature, but a group constituted of unconnected individuals who share behavioural characteristics. In the case of HIV/AIDS, the members of risk groups are viewed, for the most part, as risk-takers, people who are unable to “behave rationally and responsibly.” Kippax argues that reducing HIV/AIDS to individual behaviour ignores the underlying causes of the disease as well as the social strategies for its reduction. The whole issue of differential access to affordable drug treatment demonstrates that risk reduction is not just in the hands of the vulnerable or of risk takers, but that it is shaped by the international political economy which unevenly distributes the benefits of modern medicine. Her advocacy for a ‘social’ public health indicates that social responsibility can actually produce risk avoidance strategies which are collective and mutually negotiated. She concludes “that people can manage risk when treated as citizens with rights that, in turn, enable

and support them.” If the pharmaceutical sector of the world’s legal political economy distorts the risk of HIV infection amongst the poor across the globe, what then is the impact of the world’s illegal political economy in war zones?

Carolyn Nordstrom’s paper, “Prestidigitation: Wars, Profits and the Creation of Risk,” looks at society in failed states, where central governments no longer control their territories and the market forces engendered by war hold sway. Her principal argument is that the social risks

produced by war have remained largely invisible because little attention is given to social and economic processes in places “de-regulated’ by war: but, she asks, “how can we assess risk if it is layered in invisibilities?” Nordstrom describes the needs generated by a war economy that includes trade in guns, consumer goods and pharmaceuticals, as well as the valuable natural resources that provide the hard currency to purchase them, such as diamonds. But the legal and the illegal are symbiotic in the global economy and so are the risks produced through their interaction. On one side are the profits made by legal companies in ‘peace-zones’ that have close business ties to “war-zone’ economies; on the other side are the social risks produced by long-term degradation of social life and individual bodies made increasingly vulnerable to disease and violence. The unregulated illicit trade in cheap pharmaceuticals also produces health risks from corrupted or diluted drugs that increase health hazards and risk for individuals and communities.

Nordstrom concludes that the risks produced by war and violence are matters for global governance, which must recognize that criminality and the black market are not outside of the global system, but very much part of it and contributing significantly to the creation of Beck’s

‘world risk society.

‘Attempts to contain violence and bring peace are the topics of the final two papers, Brandon Hamber’s “Flying Flags of Fear: The Role of Fear in the Process of Political Transition” and Michael Humphreys “Terrorism, Human Rights and Social Futures: From Reconciliation to

Risk.”

Brandon Hamber explores the relationship between fear, risk and social change in the Northern Ireland peace process, which serves as a case-study for the role of fear as a political factor in times of political transition. For Hamber, this unresolved fear manifested itself in Belfast in recent years when Protestant Unionists flew Israeli flags and Catholic republicans flew Palestinian ones during the Orange marching season.

He argues that the risk of a return to sectarian violence is not just a problem of trust, but the consequence of continuing political manipulation of fears of the ‘other’ . Fear is subjective and shaped by uncertainty that rises and falls–yet, not necessarily because of objective changes in the prospects for peace. This fear is as much fear of failure-‘if we don’t try there will be further conflict’ —as it is a fear of the ‘other’ that inhibits trying. Hamber argues that insufficient attention has been paid to date to the politics of fear in the literature on transition. A medicalized model has prevailed that compartmentalizes fear as a psychological or cultural issue constructed as individual ‘trauma.’ Hamber contrasts the risks and fears of peacemaking in South Africa and Northern Ireland and argues that, in South Africa, people took greater risks because of the greater uncertainty and risk that they faced if they did not take them. This conclusion resonates with William Beeman’s observation about culture and risk perception when he notes that the greater the danger that Americans face, the greater the risk they will take. Thus, Hamber concludes, “it might be argued that the higher levels of social and economic stability in Northern Ireland, as well as smaller community networks and tighter political control, has meant that there is less political risk-taking.” In addition, politicians whose constituencies are built upon defended identities emphasize uncertainty and fear about new and different social futures. In this context, reconciliation comes to mean assimilation, loss of identity and loss of one’s cultural world and is, therefore, undesirable.

Another dimension of the risk discourse is the way that it universalizes a perspective which is, in fact, culturally specific.

Michael Humphrey’s discussion of the “war on terrorism’ as a project of global security points to the way in which the underlying politics of fear” extends the uncertainty and anxiety already manufactured in ‘world risk society.’ Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September, we have been

repeatedly told that ‘the world has changed forever’ and that it now involves an increase in risks to individual and collective security. However, the widely-shared feelings of fear and the increased risk of terrorism would be impossible without the interconnectedness created by global communications, especially television. This is an example of Beck’s ‘reflexive modernity,’ in which technological and bureaucratic solutions to the challenges of social life have become implicated in managing the unpredictability identified as risk. Increasingly, social problems become part of complex crises in which containment is the goal, not solutions and vision. While the “war on terrorism’ may be presented as being about global security, its impact on human rights actually puts people at risk. Counter-terrorism strategies (the war on terrorism) have

sought to extend individual rights and protection selectively and not universally. Anti-terrorism legislation in Western countries has led to the erosion of civil liberties and citizenship, and the American policy of ‘pre-emptive war abroad has been accompanied by presidential decrees circumscribing American obligations under the Geneva Conventions on prisoners of war and the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment and Punishment. Another dimension of the uncertainty produced by ‘international terrorism’ is the way in which ‘individual feelings’ about safety are made the basis for articulating ‘national security.’ Again, the politics of fear, as experienced by individuals, is manipulated in order to gain political support. Humphrey refers to war as a “mega-project” that emphasizes

the benefits and minimizes the risks of war as a strategy for ‘regime change’ and for which we, the public, will ultimately have to bear the undeclared social, financial and human costs. Prime Minister Blair and US President George W. Bush gambled on the mega-project of war in Iraq and the world is only now realizing the extent to which both leaders backgrounded the real risks.

What is revealing about this collection of articles written from different disciplinary perspectives is the pervasiveness of the theme of risk in our globalizing world. There are now many code words for this growing sense of risk- starting with ‘security. But one of the real dangers of risk discourse is its polarizing and divisive effects. Instead of global security and well-being based upon shared risk, risk is being displaced onto the most vulnerable. In order to counter this individual, social and cultural alienation, we need to recognize the lessons that these papers bring: that risk is socially constructed, that risk can be politically foregrounded and backgrounded and that risk is not a universal, but a particular cultural perspective on the future.

References

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Bauman, Zygmunt. 1998. Globalisation: The human consequences. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Beck, Ulrich. 1999. World risk society. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Borrás, Susan. Forthcoming. Risk society values and institutional change in the EU: The case of Genetically Modified Organisms. In Institutional change, values and learning, edited by K. Níelsen and C. Koch. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishers.

Boseley, Šarah. 2004. Mobile phone use ‘can cut sperm count.’ Guardian Weekly, 2-8 Julý, 4.

Brown, Paul. 2003. Risk to environment poses same dangers as terror, warns Blair. Guardian, 25 February.

Furedi, Frank. 2002a. Refusing to be terrorised: Managing risk after September 11th.

Global Futures. Available online at <http://www futureproof.org/refusingToBeTerrorised.htm>.2002b. Epidemic of fear. Spiked, 12 March. Available online at <http: //www.spiked-online.com>.

Luhmann, Niklas. 1993. Risk: A sociological theory. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.